

On dispossession

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Dispossession is the dark side that runs through the long history of the world's forests. It is concealed in all the bright tales we tell of modernity, of forest science, of the ascent of conservation, and of the struggles to create national parks or protect forest biodiversity in special reserves. Dispossession is the obverse of such possession; it is the topic avoided. History, after all, belongs to the victors, the possessors, for they write it, or so the old adage goes. The dispossessed should fade away, and from history, yet they may refuse. In the morning before I started to write this essay, Canberra's Commonwealth Park was full of families and flags, bands and politicians, but when all the citizenship ceremonies had been held, as they are each Australia Day, two hundred Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders marched away, their own flags flying, to protest at Parliament House on Invasion Day.

Dispossession is part of the present, as well as of Australia's black history, and it is ubiquitous, as the long history of invasions and conquest attests. I want to set the dispossession of people by forest conservation in its current stage of 'enviro-imperialism' in a longer historical context. This, I suggest, enables us to tell a forest history in terms of power relationships, rather than as one of ideological or moral or scientific triumphs. My intent is neither to downplay nor to laud the importance of conservation in its many forms, but rather to stress the power relationships at work and their social consequences.

Conservation has been advocated on practical and moral or religious grounds for centuries. In recent decades, the deep ecology movement and environmental philosophers, like Val Plumwood in Australia for example, have advanced eco-centric moral claims that, like others, have acquired some traction in world affairs.¹ While some commentators see, or yearn for this as the dawn of a post-modern, post-industrial age, others see it as only a minor influence on the realpolitik and economic drivers of our globalising world. Nevertheless, global environmental claims have major local consequences, of which dispossession is one.

Conservation refugees

Mark Dowie describes the flood of native peoples evicted from their homelands, as ever-more protected areas are created in the supposed interests of preserving biodiversity, as ‘conservation refugees’.² He starts his book with the dispossession of the Miwok people from Yellowstone, the world’s first national park created in the United States of America in 1872 at the end of the Settler–Indian wars. People had ‘no place in the landscape’ as John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club, put it, as they upset the ‘solemn calm’ of the ‘wilderness’. However, the Miwok people kept sneaking back to their traditional lands so that it was not until 1969 that the Parks Service could finally burn the last Indian settlement in a fire-fighting drill.

The number of national parks created in the world rose steadily until there were about 600 by 1950. The number and size of these parks, ‘wilderness’ areas and other forms of protected areas increased rapidly until there are about 120,000 now, covering about 12.2 per cent of the Earth’s land area. Most followed the Yellowstone model by which the inhabitants were evicted. No government carefully counted them, but various estimates put the number as between 14 and 24 million refugees in Africa alone.³ Whatever the number, it is large and eviction is often violent:

We were chased out on the first day. I didn’t know anything was happening until the police ran into my compound. They all had guns. They shouted at me, told me to run. I had no chance to say anything. They came at us and we ran, they came so violently. I was frightened for the children—I had eight children with me—but we all ran off in all directions. I took my way and the children took theirs. Other people were running, panicking,

even picking up the wrong children in the confusion. I lost everything. I had thirty-one cows, some goats and some hens. They were killed—twenty cows were killed, the rest taken. They burned everything, even the bed and the furniture and the kitchen. We're poor now. *Testimony of Joy Ngoboka, evicted from the Kibale Game Corridor in Uganda.*⁴

The expansion of protected areas and the consequent evictions was closely related to the globalisation of environmental concerns and the governmental and non-governmental institutions that are now linked in an intricate network of influence across the world.⁵ Of particular concern here is the set of big, wealthy international non-governmental organisations, or 'BINGOs', that are closely linked to agencies such as the World Bank, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and which also draw part of their funds from multi-national mining, oil and other corporations. For two US-based examples: The Nature Conservancy employs 700 scientists and has assets of \$5.6 billion (2009); and Conservation International has 1,000 employees and an operating budget of \$295 billion (2009).⁶ Their wealth is greater than the gross domestic product of many developing countries and provides them with considerable leverage. They have prestigious connections, such as those of the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF, formerly World Wildlife Fund) whose past presidents include Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands and Prince Phillip, Duke of Edinburgh. They are adept in publicising their causes, and Conservation International is brilliant in raising funds through its ecological 'hot-spot' strategy.

The debate about conservation refugees over the last decade or so has concentrated on the dispossession of indigenous or native peoples in developing tropical countries by the biodiversity movement pushed by the BINGOs. However, I would like to set it in a much longer historical context, starting with medieval Europe.

Germany

Joachim Radkau takes the relationship of nature and power as the theme of his global history of the environment.⁷ He cites the control of water and forests as founding moments in the rise of centralised states. In medieval Europe the forest law provided rulers with both an expression and a source of their political power. Its imposition created

a hierarchy of forest use from royal hunting to peasant gathering of the humblest produce, all controlled by forest courts and administered by a structure of officials.⁸ The forests were integrated with agriculture and the village economies through numerous rights to use various forest products, or 'usufructs'. These varied between regions, and between royal, church, city, community and private forests, and they changed over time, reducing peasant access and rights and thus their means of subsistence. The German princes excelled in issuing forest regulations that on one hand were designed to regenerate the forests and avert local wood supply shortages, while on the other hand served to limit peasant use in favour of industrial production.⁹ The erosion of forest rights across Europe only added to the grievances behind peasant revolts, of which the Peasant's War in Germany in 1524–1525 was the most extensive. Among its twelve demands were the rights to gather dead fire-wood, have wood for building a house, and be able to fish in the rivers.¹⁰ The German case shows the connections between the rising power of the centralising state, the interests of the rulers, the conservation of the forests, increasing industrialisation, and the dispossession of peasant rights in the forests.

The ideas of scientific forestry that developed in parts of Germany and in France from the second half of the eighteenth century envisaged a form of quantitative control that would sustain the yield of wood from the forests in the long term. The application of this 'scientific' forestry was synchronous with the economic and technological transformations that finally swept away traditional peasant uses of the forests during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The consequent general depopulation in European forest regions can only be partly explained as dispossession by the enclosure of common lands, but is more a phenomenon of the general transformations. It can be noted that in the search for a wider concept of sustainability, people are now seeking to recover some of the traditional knowledge, much of which concerns non-timber uses of the forest.¹¹

India

Imperial conquest dispossessed millions of their sovereignty and imposed its demands for trade, ports, railways and much else. It developed ideas of forest conservation and brought the ideas of

scientific forestry, often very personally by importing German foresters to India, for example. The development of British imperial forestry in India in the second half of the nineteenth century, and its extension elsewhere has been extensively discussed.¹² The degree and pace of forest dispossession that resulted varied considerably. In British India (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma) the imperial foresters had to meet timber demands for infrastructure and export from forests that were being used and inhabited by peasant and tribal peoples. The *Indian Forest Acts* of 1865 and 1878 set the model in which every use of the forests that sustained local populations had to be controlled by State forestry departments. Marlène Buchy studied how the system operated in an important forest region of South India.¹³ Forest Settlement Officers recorded the existing uses, while surveys classified the forests as 'reserved', 'protected' or 'village' forest, with sub-categories being added later to recognise special areas required for fuel-wood or fodder. Formal working plans were prepared for the valuable reserved forests along the principles of forest control, and taxes were imposed on every use, from cutting timber to gathering honey, along the principles of imperial control. The dominance of state power was exerted most forcefully in the reserved forests where the Forest Department evicted inhabitants, controlled the roads, and prohibited public access. The recorded uses were granted as 'privileges' that could be withdrawn, rather than as rights, and any agricultural extension was opposed. The Department's power was also exerted in other ways. It effectively disenfranchised the largely illiterate rural population by only dealing with the numerous complaints if they were submitted in writing, and even if this was done, it was the Department's own officers who adjudicated the complaints. More insidious was the petty bribery and oppression by the poorly paid forest rangers and guards. Buchy concluded for the area she studied that '...the peasants fought and resisted in their own manner, not always successfully, but perhaps sufficiently to make themselves heard and to discredit the foresters'.¹⁴ Peasant protests were made in many other areas, of which the Chipko movement in the Himalayan foothills in the 1970s became the best known.¹⁵

The conjunction of protests, the degraded state of much of the protected and village forests, and national goals of employment and poverty alleviation in India's Fifth National Plan (1974–1979) fostered

‘social forestry’ in which rural and indigenous forest-dependent communities were allowed to participate in forest management. Such joint forest management projects achieved some success in West Bengal and mixed results elsewhere in India, and have led to various forms of social, ‘community’ or ‘participatory’ forestry becoming an accepted approach world-wide.¹⁶ Notably, they attracted considerable support from international aid agencies. Although they can be seen as a partial repossession of rights in some Indian forests, they clashed with other policies promoting industrial wood production. Moreover, state power was generally retained through the reserved forests and was extended as more national parks and conservation areas were declared, as in the case of the Sundarbans, discussed later.

Tanzania

Thomas Sanseri has traced several waves of forest dispossession in Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika) from 1820 to the present.¹⁷ The export of copal, an aromatic resin used for varnish, wild rubber, and mangrove poles and timber had opened its coastal forests to traders and colonists who gradually reached farther inland. Germany colonised Tanzania in the 1880s and established a forestry administration to control the valuable mangrove forests in 1898. Its goal was to replace what it saw as destructive African use with scientific forestry. It created forest and game reserves from which villagers were gradually ‘relocated’. Relocation is a bland term for the reality of removal. It masks the reality of loss of home and the fact that in densely populated countries there are few vacant sites and no desirable ones to which people could go. In 1905 the peasants rebelled in the Maji Maji War against the German policies of forced cotton growing, the restrictions in the new reserves, and the disruption of the chiefs’ power to gain wealth from the copal, rubber and ivory trades. After the rebellion had been put down, the foresters demarcated more reserves in the rebellious region to boost colonial authority in the eyes of the subjugated peasants. Forest conservation had become a counter-insurgency measure.

Tanganyika became a British colony after the Second World War and was subject to a development policy that forcibly relocated small peasant settlements to create more forest reserves.¹⁸ Twenty thousand displaced peasants were leased forest plots under the *taungya* system

that had been developed in Burma. It allowed former shifting cultivators or other peasants to grow their food for a few years, provided that they planted and tended young trees. It effectively used the dispossessed people to create forestry plantations at negligible cost to the state. The social discontent caused by such policies only served to hasten independence in 1961.

The new nation sought rapid economic development by increasing timber production, exporting charcoal, and establishing plantations of exotic pines and eucalypts, some as village woodlots, all of which provided employment. However, the imperial dispossessions that had gone before were as nothing when compared to the eleven million peasants who were relocated into *ujamaa* villages under President Nyerere's 1967 Africanist-socialist policy of collectivising agriculture. This with drought and the oil shocks of the 1970s caused Tanzania to fall deeply into debt and to rely on foreign aid to avert starvation. Some of the forest reserves were officially cleared for agriculture, while resilient peasants encroached on others to survive.

Tanzania's debt made it particularly vulnerable to contradictory international pressures. Economically, the World Bank's structural adjustment program required the economy to be privatised, timber exports increased, and wildlife tourism boosted to raise revenue. Ecologically, Tanzania's forests became prized for their biodiversity, especially in the 'biodiversity hotspots' in the Eastern rainforests. The two pressures were exerted through the intricate networks of governmental and non-governmental organisations that linked international and national levels. The balance of power and influence shifted in stages marked by a series of plans and agreements: the national Conservation Strategy (1980), the International Monetary Fund Accord for structural adjustment (1986), and the National Forest Programme (2001). The pressures were combined in the 1990s when the World Bank insisted that its structural adjustment funding was conditional on Tanzania having a Conservation Plan. These plans reflected the traction gained by the BINGOs who were given a formal role in planning forest management with the prime objective of preserving biodiversity. The Eastern rainforests were protected by declaring further reserves, evicting the peasants, and prohibiting local use. Environmental interest then stretched out to the inland woodlands that traditionally were common lands. Current forest management

theory favours participatory or community management schemes and these were commenced on the margins of the forest reserves and through the woodlands. They were undertaken within the framework of the Forest and Conservation Plans and were generally funded by international organisations. The BINGOs and their local offshoots set their agendas and in some cases became the paymasters of the state's forest guards. The schemes extended control outside the reserves and closed areas to free access.

The relocations, losses of local forest use, and effective closure of common woodlands led to many forms of local resistance that ranged from occupation, to conflicts with forest guards, and hostility to the WWF's officers. Resistance was overcome most dramatically in 1998 when the riot police evicted 750–1,000 people from a village adjacent to the Kazimzumbwi forest and prevented their return by burning their crops and houses. Sanseri observes that expanding the reserves and pushing the community forest management schemes served to increase the state's control. Although this echoes the German princes and Tanzania's colonial rulers, the Tanzanian state's control only existed within the global domain of economic and environmental influence. It became a new imperialism.

Sundarbans

Ranjan Chakrabarti's environmental history of the Indian Sundarbans provides another example of the changing relationships between nature, people and power over a similar period to Sanseri's study of Tanzania.¹⁹ The Sundarbans on the Gangetic delta, partly in India and partly in Bangladesh, is the largest mangrove forest in the world and the home of man-eating tigers. Now the Indian Sundarbans has a high conservation status as an International Biosphere Reserve, a Ramsar site, a World Heritage Area, a national park and one of the Project Tiger reserves, designed to save the tiger from extinction. Such status is a reverse from how the region was regarded historically. Its fertile mudflats supported scattered farms and villages, while its myriad river channels, marine backwaters and seemingly impenetrable jungle made it a haven for pirates and refugees. Its forests were a potential source of revenues for the colonial state, which reserved increasing areas of them from 1875. It also started land reclamation schemes, but

these and forest work were disrupted by frequent tiger attacks, many of which killed the victims. Some 500 villagers and workers were killed between 1906 and 1909 in spite of a bounty for killing tigers that had been introduced in 1881 and administered by the Forest Department. By 1912 over 2,400 tigers had been killed in the Sundarbans.

An early marker of the global extension of Western environmentalism was the IUCN's meeting in New Delhi in 1969. Wildlife biologists reported that only 2,000 Asian tigers remained in the wild from Bhutan to the Sundarbans. Action was needed and the Indian Government was sympathetic; tiger shooting was banned, a Wildlife Protection Act was passed, Project Tiger was started in 1973 in nine reserved forests, and the international WWF launched its parallel Operation Tiger with a pledge of one million dollars. In the Sundarbans, the Forest Department set out a core area for the tigers, closed the roads, stopped grazing and timber cutting, relocated the villages out of the surrounding buffer areas, and severely punished anyone caught killing a tiger.

Community forest management schemes were introduced in the buffer areas and other forests, perhaps in the hope that they might offset some of the local people's long-standing hostility to the Forest Department. Nevertheless, local people continue to use the forest for their sustenance, braving both tigers and guards; and tigers still kill people in the forest and in surrounding villages. The power of the state to follow the environmental agenda in the Sundarbans is tempered not only by the hostility of local people, but also by corrupt practices of the guards and officials.

Australia

Australia provides one of the few cases where the entire population was dispossessed of its land by invading settlers. The subsequent processes by which settlement occurred are well known, as is the history of modern forestry, which more or less followed on the British imperial model, but unlike India or Tanzania, the Australian state forest reserves and national parks were created well *after* most of the inhabitants had been forcibly relocated into special Aboriginal reserves. Only the most remote regions remained occupied by their traditional inhabitants. In the settled regions, the Aboriginal reserves

were often moved, reduced or revoked to satisfy settlers' demands, with consequent secondary dispossession from whatever meagre benefits the inhabitants had enjoyed.²⁰ Two further types of secondary dispossession from the forests—of timber workers and of Aborigines—occurred from the 1970s as environmental claims gained political traction, and paradoxically as Aboriginal claims started to gain some success.²¹

The secondary dispossession of timber workers and small businesses resulted from environmental opposition to logging in the native forests, with the Australian Conservation Foundation, for example, declaring in 1987 that its objective was to end logging in all state forests and have them turned into national parks. An Australian claim for 'wilderness' aped Yellowstone's romantic construct of a place where the grand processes of nature could operate undisturbed by human hands, while being reverentially observed or photographed by the cognoscenti.²² Perhaps it is not surprising that Australia's Wilderness Society was formed in Tasmania, the State in which the Aboriginal population had been dispossessed, relocated and almost annihilated to the greatest extent. The two claims proved so politically effective that extensive areas of forest reserves, and other state forested areas that the timber industry had expected to use, were turned into national parks. During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s many timber workers lost their jobs, and small sawmills closed with depressing effects on rural communities. This form of secondary dispossession was largely one of expectations, rather than of formal rights, and was exacerbated by long-term trends in the forest industries.²³ Edwina Loxton has discussed this in another paper in this collection.²⁴

The secondary dispossessions of Aboriginal people from Australian forests resulted from the reactions of entrenched attitudes, conservative politics, bureaucratic processes, and environmental claims to the real or expected gains made by Aboriginal people. They were secondary in the sense that the reactions limited, impeded or over-rode whatever rights the Aboriginal people managed to repossess. Five aspects of the complex and gradually evolving history of claims, repossessions, reactions and secondary dispossessions that are relevant to forests can be mentioned here.

The first formal recognition of Aboriginal interests in the forests emerged in the 1970s almost as an add-on item in the heritage and

environmental impact assessments that were being specified by State and Federal Governments as they tried to juggle competing development and environmental pressures. Australian archaeologists, who had previously concentrated on coastal and dry inland sites, developed ways of assessing Aboriginal heritage on a landscape scale.²⁵ Such assessments have now become standard practice at landscape and coupe scales. While they provide some repossession of Aboriginal culture, they impose a *museum* perspective that keeps any rights perspective safely beyond its pale.

The argument that Aboriginal peoples have managed the forests with minimum impact for many thousands of years before settlement had considerable environmental appeal when contrasted with the impacts of settler society in only two hundred years. Various projects recorded or reconstructed traditional knowledge in the hope that it might hold the key to managing land at present. They were most successful in some Northern Australian forests where it was still possible to learn the fire management practices of the pre-settlement hunter-gather society.

The Aboriginal claims to repossess land *rights* were only granted where unbroken traditional links to the land could be proved. Given the history of relocations, this was so difficult that claims became enmeshed in judicial and administrative processes that dragged on for years. The Yorta Yorta people, for example, lodged a claim to an area that included the Barmah forest in 1994, only to have it fail in the High Court in 2002.²⁶ Claims were also recognised to various lesser degrees under State legislation and administrative practice. The complex pattern of rights, qualified rights and permissions that has been created in Australia enables bureaucratic and legalistic processes to limit and delay possible repossession of rights. Any chance that Aboriginal people might have had for redress under international law was stalled by a conservative government from 2007 until 2009 when a new government endorsed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Joint management schemes have been adopted in many national parks over which Aboriginal people repossessed rights. They cover areas such as Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park where the land rights granted in 1985 were accompanied by a long-term lease to the parks authority. Such schemes, rooted in the museum perspective, allow or

licence Aboriginal people to hunt or fish, but only if they use traditional methods. While they provide various benefits to Aboriginal people, the environmental priorities and planning ethos of the parks authorities appears little changed.

The Regional Forest Agreement process, that governed the allocation of forest land between state forests and national parks in the late 1990s, was the largest, most expensive national forest planning process ever undertaken, and occurred when Aboriginal land rights were being recognised in federal legislation and the High Court.²⁷ The extent to which Aboriginal claims and interests were considered in the process was reviewed in 2001 by Haripriya Rangan and Marcus Lane. They concluded that only in the Eden area did Aboriginal people have anything more than a marginal role, as their claims were only recognised in terms of cultural significance, while their economic needs and rights were ignored. Moreover, the agreements effectively suspended native title claims for their twenty-year duration.²⁸

Environmental claims for 'wilderness' were extended by adding a category of 'wild rivers', and applying it over lands to which Aboriginal people had gained various land rights. The category gained political recognition in Australia in 1992, following a much earlier US model. By 1999 the relevant rivers had been mapped for the Australian Heritage Commission.²⁹ Most were in Northern Australia where Aboriginal presence and land rights were strongest. The Queensland Government passed a *Wild Rivers Act* in 2005 that protected the environmental values of certain rivers by limiting the development that could take place in or around them. A three-cornered contest between environmental, Aboriginal and mining claims erupted in 2010 when three major rivers were declared to be 'wild' in the tropical forest areas of Cape York and a moratorium was placed on development. Although consultation with the sometimes divergent Aboriginal views was mandated, it is clear that environmental claims over-rode Aboriginal ones.

The Australian case reveals the way in which the environmental movement and other political forces dispossessed many timber workers and severely limited or impeded what rights Aboriginal people had managed to repossess.

Dualities

In this essay I have argued that possession and dispossession is the first duality of forest history. Although the power to evict people is the strongest form of possession, I have extended possession and hence dispossession beyond land tenure in its legal sense. This is important for forests with their multiple uses, values and scales. The sense of 'belonging to place', for example, can be a powerful emotional claim, and its loss is a form of dispossession. Similarly, the sense of community in rural villages can be felt as a loss in the transition to the individualistic mode of modern, industrial and urban society. The duality of scale can be seen at its extreme as the global BINGOs strive to evict native peoples from their homelands in developing countries. Their moral claims to preserve iconic species or some generalised concept of biodiversity encounters the people's moral claims to the quiet enjoyment of their birthright, but as the historian E. H. Carr puts it, 'the fatal dualism of politics will always keep consideration of morality entangled with consideration of power'.³⁰

Although the dualities of power between possessors and dispossessors, and between repossessors and reactionaries have been mentioned in five cases in this paper, little attention could be given in the space available to the dialectic nature of their interactions. In *Conservation Refugees*, however, Mark Dowie has been able to discuss at length how the plight of conservation refugees has been brought into the global policy forums, and how the policy statements of international bodies, like the IUCN and the WWF, have recently acknowledged the rights and interests of indigenous people.³¹ Little attention was given in this paper to the many ameliorative and compensatory activities that have accompanied or followed the creation of protected areas, nor could more than cursory attention be given to the numerous community level projects that attempt to marry peasant subsistence with the conservation of forest biodiversity. How far the policy statements, ameliorative activities or community projects will play out is a topic for future forest histories.

I hope that this essay will prompt some discussion about how such future histories might be written. I suggest that the creation of 'refugees' by conservation precedes the current flood of people from the biodiversity reserves, that possession and dispossession are two sides of the conservation coin. Looking at the present, Geisler sees the

many affinities between big conservation projects and big development projects in their scale, political and institutional arrangements, and in their social impacts. In his words, 'the relationship between conservation and capitalist development is intimate and complex' so that 'the impoverishment processes at work in remote places will certainly benefit from...deeper analysis'.³² I suggest that forest historians could contribute to the task.

Notes

- 1 The term deep ecology was coined by Arne Naess and has been taken up by a movement that asserts the fundamental rights of nature in an 'eco-centric' way. Plumwood, V. 1993. *Feminism and the mastery of nature* (London: Routledge).
- 2 Dowie, M. 2009. *Conservation Refugees: the hundred-year conflict between global conservation and native peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology). The term 'conservation refugees' is also used by others, such as Geisler, C. 2003. 'A new kind of trouble: evictions in Eden', *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 175, March, pp.69–78. See also papers in the special issue of *Conservation and Society*, vol. 7(1), 2009.
- 3 Dowie 2009, p. xx; Geisler 2003.
- 4 Cited by Dowie 2009, p. 43.
- 5 In relation to the forest sector see Dargavel, J. 2011. Netting the global forest: attempts at influence. *Global Environment* no.5, pp.127–158.
- 6 The Nature Conservancy. *Annual Report 2009*, www.nature.org/aboutus/annualreport/; Conservation International. *Annual Report 2009*, www.conservation.org/discover/annual_report/
- 7 Radkau, J. 2008. *Nature and power: a global history of the environment*, translated by Thomas Dunlap (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- 8 For France see Bechmann, R. 1990. *Trees and man: the forest of the late Middle Ages*, translated by Kathryn Dunham (New York: Paragon House). For England see James, N. D. G. 1981. *A history of English forestry* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- 9 Radkau, *Nature and power*, pp. 138–139.
- 10 Engels, F. 1926 [1850]. *The Peasant War in Germany*, translated by M. J. Olgin (New York: International Publishers).
- 11 For example, the International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO) has a Traditional Forest Knowledge task force.
- 12 See for example, Barton, G. 2002. *Empire forestry and the origins of environmentalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- 13 Buchy, M. 1996. *Teak and Arecanut: Colonial State, Forest and People in the Western Ghats (South India) 1800–1947* (Pondichery: Institute Français de Pondichéry—Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts).
- 14 Buchy 1996, p. 197.

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- 15 Guha, R. 1989. *The unquiet woods: ecological change and peasant resistance in the Himalaya* (Delhi: Oxford University Press).
 - 16 Rangan, H. and Lane, M. B. 2001. Indigenous peoples and forest management: comparative analysis of institutional approaches in Australia and India. *Society and Natural Resources* 14, pp. 145–160.
 - 17 Sunseri, T. 2009. *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820–2000* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press).
 - 18 A grandiose but failing scheme to grow peanuts (groundnuts) was also undertaken.
 - 19 Chakrabarti, R. 2009. Local people and the global tiger: an environmental history of the Sundarbans. *Global Environment*, no. 3, pp. 72–95.
 - 20 In an unusual case, in the Northern Territory settler pressure succeeded in having boundaries changed in a way that was offset by increasing the size of the overall reserve. See: Dargavel, J. 2004. Persistence and transition on the Wangites-Wagait Reserves, 1892-1976. *Journal of Northern Territory History* 15, pp. 5–19.
 - 21 The progress of the Aboriginal claims was marked federally by full Aboriginal citizenship in 1962, the Federal referendum in 1967, the *Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT)* 1976, and the Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996) cases in the High Court. The progress of environmental claims was marked by *Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act* 1974, *Australian Heritage Commission Act* 1975, *World Heritage Conservation Act* 1983, the Franklin Dams case in the High Court in the same year, and the *Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act* 1999. The claims were also marked by State legislation.
 - 22 Major texts in the extensive literature are Cronon, W. (ed.) 1995. *Uncommon ground: rethinking the human place in nature* (New York: Norton); and Nash, R. 2001. *Wilderness and the American mind* (New Haven: Nota Bene), 4th edn. [1st edn. Yale University Press, 1967].
 - 23 Dargavel, J. 1995. *Fashioning Australia's forests* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press).
 - 24 Loxton, E., Schirmer, J., Kanowski, P. and Dargavel, J. 2012. Cumulative social impacts in northern NSW: Forest policy 1980–2010. In Stubbs, B. J., Lennon, J., Specht, A. and Taylor, J. (ed.) *Australia's Ever-Changing Forests VI* (Canberra: The Australian Forest History Society Inc.), pp. 83–93.
 - 25 Feary, S. 1988. Aboriginal use of forests in South-eastern Australia, past and present. In Kevin Frawley and Noel Semple (ed.), *Australia's Ever Changing Forests: Proceedings of the First National Conference on Australian Forest History*. (Campbell, ACT: Department of Geography and Oceanography, Australian Defence Force Academy), pp. 179–197.
 - 26 The failure of the Yorta Yorta claim to the Barmah forest was immediately followed by a co-operative management agreement between the people and the State of Victoria. Such agreements provide for joint management or advisory committees but leave the state parks authorities to run them.

- 27 Dargavel, J. 1998. Politics, policy and process in the forests. *Australian Journal of Environmental Management* 5(1) pp. 25–30; Catherine Mobbs 2003. National forest policy and regional forest agreements, In Dovers, S. and Wild River, S. (ed.), *Managing Australia's Environment* (Sydney: Federation Press), pp. 90–114.
- 28 Rangan, H. and Lane, M. B. 2001. Indigenous peoples and forest management: comparative analysis of institutional approaches in Australia and India. *Society and Natural Resources* 14, pp.145–160.
- 29 Stein, J. L., Stein, J. A and Nix, H. A. n.d. [1999]. The Identification of Wild Rivers: Methodology and database development (Canberra: Report for the Australian Heritage Commission).
- 30 Carr, E. H. 1958. *The twenty years' crisis: an introduction to the study of international relations* (London: Mamillan), cited by Ralph Pettman 'Conclusion', in Pettman, R. (ed.) 1979. *Moral claims in world affairs* (Canberra: Australian National University Press), p. 196.
- 31 Dowie 2009, particularly ch. 12.
- 32 Geisler 2003.